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Court-Ordered Foster Family




The authors examine the implications ofG. L. v.
Zumwalt, a case that resulted in a far-reaching
consent decree that mandates specific reforms in
policy and practice to be implemented by a public
social welfare agency in its delivery of services to
foster children and their families.
The 1970s saw an unprecedented increase in federal civil rights litigation on
behalf of pre-trial detainees, prisoners, mental patients, and the mentally
retarded. Over the course of the decade these lawsuits have had a profound
effect upon the way such persons subsequently were treated by state and local
governments. Court orders, for example, required extensive physical reno-
vations of prisons, jails, and mental institutions; in some cases unsuitable
facilities were even closed by court decrees. Judicial review held up to close
scrutiny—often for the first time—the administration of these important gov-
ernmental services [1].
Until recently, however, virtually no similar litigation was brought to affirm
the constitutional rights of foster children to adequate care. Litigation in this
area usually dealt with only one or two foster children, rather than an entire
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system, and focused on relatively narrow issues [2]. Moreover, most of these
cases sought damages rather than a judicial order to reform the foster care
system [3].
In G. L. V. Zumwalt, for the first time, a federal court approved a consent
decree mandating specific widespread improvements in the policies and prac-
tices of the entire foster care system of a major metropolitan area—Jackson
County, Missouri, which encompasses Kansas City [4]. A consent decree is
a binding judicial order resulting from an agreement negotiated between the
parties to the lawsuit. In this respect, the defendants in G. L. deserve rec-
ognition for voluntarily agreeing to the changes and to being bound by the
order that resulted from the negotiations. The G. L. decree marks a—perhaps
dramatic, perhaps evolutionary—change from past judicial noninvolvement
in this area that has important implications for the child welfare community
[5]. Because of its significance, the case was widely reported in the press
[6], and, in a highly unusual step, the judge directed that the consent decree
be published in the official national reporter of the federal district court [7].
The G. L. case may be a harbinger of the future. Indeed, just four months
after the G. L. decree was approved, another federal court decree was issued
placing the operation of the foster care system of an entire state under federal
court supervision [8].
This article places the G. L. v. Zumwalt case in context by examining its
background, the individual factual charges that led to the filing of the com-
plaint, the legal framework that provided the basis for the court's involvement,
the evidence uncovered concerning the treatment of foster children by the
agency, and the specific provisions of the consent decree. The article con-
cludes with a brief discussion of the implications of the case for the child
welfare field, intended to provide child care professionals with information
about how such lawsuits can arise, why they are heard by the courts, what
kind of evidence is significant, and what the results of this new development
can be.
Background of the Case
In the mid-1970s, attorneys from a local Legal Aid Society who were regularly
assigned as guardian ad litem to represent abused and neglected children in
juvenile court proceedings became alarmed that many children who had been
placed in foster care for their own protection were not receiving the care that
the state had an obligation to provide. Children who were removed from their
biological families, often because of allegations of abuse and neglect, were
further harmed, physically and emotionally, while in state custody.
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The following are examples of some of the children represented by Legal
Aid lawyers who became the named plaintiffs in this lawsuit [9]:
G. L. was a 3-year-old child who had been in foster care since he was an
infant. Although at an early age he had exhibited severe behavior problems
that were known to the foster care agency, no effort was made to provide
counseling to assist his foster parents in coping with his problems. Five months
after he was placed in his second foster home he was admitted to a hospital
emergency room with first- and second-degree bums on his hands, massive
bruises on his buttocks, and other lacerations scattered over his body. A
subsequent investigation determined that the injuries were caused by his foster
parents. Before the abuse occurred, the foster parents had tried unsuccessfully
to obtain help from the agency because of the difficulty they were having
with the child.
D. T. was a 15-year-old foster child. Her foster mother repeatedly, and in
the presence of other foster children, told the child, who was white, that her
mother was a tramp and a whore because she had given birth to another child
by a black man. The foster mother also refused to obtain medical attention
for D. T. despite her frequent fainting spells, dizziness, recurring headaches,
and menstrual problems. As a result, D. T. suffered a ruptured ovarian cyst
that inflamed her appendix; an emergency operation was necessary for the
removal of one of her ovaries and appendix.
When he was placed in foster care, T. W. was a 3-year-old child with a
speech impediment, language problems, and learning disabilities. At school-
age, he was enrolled by the agency in a special education program. The school
told the agency that his foster mother refused to cooperate with the school
program, which required that she supplement the child's education at home.
The foster mother threw the teachers out of her house when they tried to
show her how to work with T. W., and subsequently told the agency that the
teachers would not be allowed in her house again. The agency was also
informed by the school that the foster parents were physically abusing the
child, who frequently came to the school with unexplained bruises. Further-
more, during this time, T. W.'s foster father was suspected of having sexually
abused K. W., T. W.'s sister, who was about 6 years old at the time. Yet,
the agency, which had noted that the foster mother was disorganized and had
an unclean home, did not place the children in a new foster home, allowing
both to remain in this home for more than a year-and-a-half, during which
time a worker rarely visited the foster home despite knowledge of these very
serious problems.
R. M. was a 3-year-old child with emotional problems who was moved six
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times by the agency during the first six months of placement. Although he
had obvious and severe behavioral problems, there was no evidence that the
agency had provided any special assistance to any of the child's foster parents
or any treatment for the child. His failed placements included one family that
had specifically informed the agency beforehand of its inability to handle
children with behavioral problems, and another family that had four of its
own children and eight other foster children at the time R. M. was placed.
Frustrated by their inability to provide help for children such as those we
have described, either from the agency or in individual juvenile court pro-
ceedings, lawyers for Legal Aid turned to the federal court. The Legal Aid
lawyers subsequently were joined by lawyers for the Children's Rights Project
of the ACLU.
In the lawsuit that the attorneys filed they claimed that these cases were
not unusual. The amended complaint charged that harm to foster children
was inevitable because the foster care agency did not adequately select, li-
cense, train, and supervise foster parents; it did not match foster children
with suitable homes; it overcrowded foster homes; it failed to provide adequate
medical, psychological, and educational services; and it assigned excessive
caseloads to child care workers [10]. The complaint sought to have each of
these problems rectified, and sought monetary damages on behalf of each of
the named plaintiffs [11].
The Legal Basis for Judicial Involvement
Prior to G. L., a federal court had never before dealt with a class action
lawsuit that sought such sweeping changes in a foster care system as those
described above, based upon allegations of violations of foster children's
constitutional rights. It was therefore necessary to establish a legal basis for
the federal court, which has only limited power, to entertain the lawsuit.
A doctrine of key importance for the G. L. lawsuit grew out of litigation
on behalf of mentally retarded persons. In a famous case concerning the
Willowbrook State School for the Mentally Retarded in Staten Island, New
York, Judge Orrin Judd enunciated a new doctrine called simply "the right
to freedom from harm." Judd held that "a tolerable living environment is
. . . guaranteed by law" for persons who are taken into state custodial care
[12]. Two years later, in approving a consent judgment in that case, Judd
went even further: "protection from harm requires relief more extensive than
this court originally contemplated, because harm can result not only from
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neglect but from conditions which cause regression or which prevent devel-
opment of an individual's capabilities" [13].
Judd's doctrine of "the right to freedom from harm" is tailor-made for
foster children. The purpose of foster care is to provide care and sustenance
to children whose parents have been unable, for one reason or another, to
care for them [14]. Foster care places the government in the role of a parent.
Haying assumed the mantle of protector, the state can hardly escape respon-
sibility for behaving in ways that replicate the conduct of harmful parents
[15]. Yet there were two possible distinctions between the G. L. case and
cases in which the protection-from-harm doctrine was developed.
The first was that, in G. L., much of the harm was inflicted by licensed
foster parents, who are not technically state employees. Nevertheless, the
conduct of foster parents is the responsibility of the state that selects and
licenses parents and should also train them. The state places the foster child,
for whom it has legal custody, with the foster family and is obligated to
supervise the home and the care the child receives. The judge in G. L.,
therefore, refused to credit the distinction regarding nonemployee status with
having any legal significance [16].
The second possible distinction was that the foster children in G. L., unlike
the plaintiffs in the Willowbrook case or other such cases, were not in a single
institution where state supervision is more direct and abuses may be more
readily apparent. But foster children are not immune from abuse simply
because they usually are not institutionalized. G. L.'s third-degree bums were
no less severe because they occurred in a foster family's home rather than a
dormitory or cell. The critical factor that unites foster care with other state
custodial arrangements is that in both situations the government has undertaken
a special caretaking relationship with the individual.
In sum, by the late 1970s, the evolution of constitutional law under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments had moved to encompass protection from
mistreatment for persons in state custody. The corollary evolution of the
doctrine of the right to freedom from harm made it almost inevitable that the
federal court would assert its power to hear the G. L. case. Indeed, it would
have been anomalous for the federal court to hold that the plaintiffs in G. L.,
who were innocent children, had less constitutional rights to protection while
in state custody than adults [17].
Marshalling the Evidence
The plaintiffs in G. L. had to do more than show that they had a constitutional
right to freedom from harm. To prevail in a civil rights class action, sporadic
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and individual violations are not sufficient; there must be a pattern and practice
of injury [18].
In G. L., plaintiffs' attorneys attempted to meet this burden by commis-
sioning an empirical study of the treatment provided to foster children. A
random sample was selected of 194 children who had entered the foster care
system within the last five years. Casereaders (who were graduate students
in sociology) used a 61-page survey instrument to record information from
715 case files. The files included one for each sample child, one for the
child's biological parents, and one for the first and second foster homes (if
the sample child had been placed in more than one home). Data were collected
concerning key elements of proper foster care services such as those set forth
in nationally recognized standards of foster care services as promulgated by
the Child Welfare League of America (CWLA) [19] and the American Public
Welfare Association (APWA) [20]. The data were then analyzed and reported
in a 105-page study filed with the court [21].
The results of the study demonstrated that the mistreatment that G. L.,
D. T., T. W., K. W., and R. M. received was not atypical. In every key
area of service significant breakdowns in the delivery of essential care oc-
curred. Key findings of the study included the following:
Stability of care [22]
1. Twenty-nine percent of the sample children were in four or more homes
(in less than five years).
2. Thirty-one percent of the sample children had four or more caseworkers.
3. The longer a child remained in care, the more likely he/she was to
experience movement from home to home and turnover in caseworkers.
Provision of essential services to foster children [23]
1. In 20% of the cases in which the caseworker noted a physical, emotional,
or intellectual problem, the agency failed to provide services to address that
problem.
2. In 74% of the cases there was no record of face-to-face caseworker
visits with the child during the past year. In 25% of the cases there was no
record of any caseworker contact with the child, even by telephone.
3. A large number of cases lacked medical records. In 59% of the cases,
there was no record of a medical examination in the past year. In 87% of the
cases, there was no documentation of a dental examination in the past year.
Perrrtanency planning [24]
1. Sixty-three percent of all open cases were in care for over two years.
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2. The most common case plan for these cases (55%) was long-term foster
care, and only 23% of these children were teenagers.
3. The study identified two possible explanations for the high number of
children in long-term foster care: (a) the agency rarely pursued adoption as
an alternative—only 9% of the sample children had adoption as a case plan
(89% of these children were under the age of six); and (b) the agency did
little work with biological parents. In 77% of the cases there was no record
of caseworker contact with the parent in the past year, and written service
agreements were entered into with less than 30% of the parents during that
time.
Suitability of the foster home and licensing, supervision, and training of
foster parents [25].
1. Forty-three percent of the sample children were placed in a foster home
described as unsuitable during their first or second foster home placement.
Foster homes were denoted by the study, based upon caseworkers' notes in
the case files, as being "unsuitable" because (a) the foster parents had a
known history of abuse or neglect; (b) placement of the sample child in that
home created a clear danger to the child; (c) the foster parents failed to provide
essential care to foster children; or (d) the foster family was known to lack
the skills to care for a child with the characteristics of the sample child.
2. Not only were many of the foster homes in which children were placed
described as unsuitable, but practices regarding licensing, training, and su-
pervision of the foster families were also found to be inadequate.
a. Placement of a sample child in violation of the restrictions set out in
the foster home's license occurred in 14% of the cases for the first foster
home placement, and in 15% of the cases in the second foster home.
b. In 92% of the cases there was no recorded caseworker contact with
the first foster family in the past year; this was true in 89% of the second
foster families.
c. Fewer than 3% of the foster parents had received any foster parent
training.
Investigations of suspected abuse or neglect of foster children [26].
1. The study identified 28 cases, 14% ofthe sample, involving 35 separate
incidents, in which there was either a referral for an abuse or neglect inves-
tigation of a sample child while in a foster home, or an indication by a
caseworker of a clear suspicion that abuse or neglect was occurring to the
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sample child in a foster home, or an indication to the same effect by the
casereader from a review of the case file.
2. In 63% of the suspected abuse or neglect cases the agency did not refer
the case for investigation, although social service workers are mandated re-
porters. In over 43% of these cases there was no record that even an internal
investigation of the suspected child mistreatment occurred.
The Consent Decree
The 44-page consent decree in G. L. marks the first time in the United States
that high quality standards of foster care administration were mandated by
federal court order. The standards of the G. L. decree were designed to prevent
the systemic breakdown in child protection that was identified in each plain-
tiff's case and further documented by the study of a random sample of case
records.
The decree covers 14 different aspects of foster care service, ranging from
licensing of foster homes to medical care and counseling, and from perma-
nency planning to foster parent training.
Many of the consent decree provisions incorporate the standards of the
CWLA and APWA. What distinguishes the provisions of the decree from
these standards is that the decree is legally binding and can be enforced by
the federal court, while the CWLA and APWA standards are only advisory.
Among the important aspects of the decree, several stand out as being
particularly noteworthy:
1. An absolute prohibition against the use of corporal punishment of chil-
dren in foster care, and mandatory training for foster parents and social service
staff members in the prevention of abuse and neglect in foster care [27].
2. A limitation on the size of caseloads carried by child welfare social
service workers, the maximum figure being fixed as 25 [28]. Similarly, the
consent decree specifies a maximum ratio of one supervisor to seven social
service workers [29]. The decree also mandates extensive preservice and
inservice training for all social service workers and the supervisory staff [30].
3. Social service workers must visit each child in the foster home at least
once every two weeks; a telephone contact is not acceptable in lieu of the
actual home visit. During the home visit the caseworker is to speak with the
child in private as well as in the presence of the foster family [31]. Weekly
visits between the child and the biological family are required except where
specific factors make such visits inadvisable or physically impossible, and
this is noted and incorporated in an approved case plan [32].
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4. Each child is to be enrolled in a health maintenance organization or
prepaid medical plan [33]. Each child must receive a physical examination
within 24 hours after coming into care, and an eye, hearing, and dental
examination within 30 days [34]. A treatment plan is required for the cor-
rection of any identified problem [35]. Foster parents are to be assisted in
meeting a child's medical needs, including the provision of baby-sitting ser-
vices and transportation expenses, when necessary. When no other arrange-
ments are possible, the agency bears the final responsibility for ensuring that
the child is taken for the required examinations and treatment [36].
5. In addition to the treatment of medical problems, the decree requires
the agency to assess the psychological, emotional, and intellectual needs of
each foster child within 30 days of the child's coming into care. If a problem
is identified, the agency must ensure that the child receives adequate profes-
sional services [37].
6. A uniform case record system is to be developed to capture essential
information about foster children, their biological parents, and the foster
parents in a concise and reliable way [38].
7. A preliminary case plan must be developed for each child within 30
days [39]. Long-term foster care is an inappropriate plan for any child under
the age of 15, absent special circumstances [40]. Similarly, without special
reasons, the agency may not continue to plan to retum a child home when
there has been no contact between the parent and child for six months [41].
8. The decree mandates supervised preplacement visits in the foster home
and an overnight preplacement visit whenever possible [42].
9. Careful matching of the foster child with the foster family is required,
and in no case may the placement of a foster child violate the licensing
restrictions or stated preferences of the foster parents [43].
To ensure that all of the foregoing reforms are fully implemented, the
decree provides several enforcement mechanisms. The defendants must pro-
vide plaintiffs' counsel with semiannual reports on the implementation of key
provisions of the decree and the status of foster children in Jackson County.
Plaintiffs' counsel also has quarterly access to case records to monitor im-
plementation and the right to seek the assistance of the court to enforce the
provisions of the decree. This is an essential element of the decree, for without
these provisions there would be no mechanism to make the promise of the
decree a reality for these children. It also means that the responsibilities of
plaintiffs' counsel do not end with having reached a final decree. As much
time can be spent in monitoring and ensuring the full implementation of a
decree such as this one as in preparation for a trial, and the decree provides
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for this role by plaintiffs' counsel for at least five years. In fact, case readings
similar to the type discussed under "Marshalling the Evidence" will be
necessary to monitor the implementation of many sections of the decree, as
well as frequent communications and discussions with the defendants to re-
solve problems with implementation. If such problems cannot be resolved,
either party may petition the court to enforce or modify specific provisions
of the decree.
Implications of the G. L. Case
The G. L. consent decree may have been the first comprehensive court order
regulating a large foster care system, but it is hard to imagine that it will be
the last [44]. Indeed, the federal judge who approved the decree directed that
it be reported nationally "because of the assistance this case may render other
courts considering similar questions" [45].
Although judicial involvement may be considered by some to be an un-
necessary intrusion, in the opinion of the authors of this article, this trend is
potentially beneficial to those dedicated to the improvement of the child
welfare field.
The judicial process is a way of setting enforceable minimum standards
for the child welfare field. Through the G. L. court decree, the professional
standards set by voluntary organizations such as the Child Welfare League
of America and the American Public Welfare Association, which are not by
themselves enforceable, have the power of law.
Enforceable standards are a valuable aid to hard-pressed child welfare
administrators who often must deal with pressure for budget-cutting at the
expense of the welfare of children. Child welfare professionals all too fre-
quently have been driven to despair by the actions of federal and state leg-
islatures with respect to the provision of adequate funding for child welfare
services. Before now, local administrators often lacked the power to fight
successfully for additional resources even when convinced that they were
necessary. An administrator under court order, however, is frequently in a
much better position to negotiate with the legislative or executive branch,
since failure to provide sufficient funding to comply with a judicial decree
can subject the agency and the administrator to enforcement proceedings for
violation of a federal court order, as well as to adverse publicity. A court
order, therefore, provides an added incentive to provide adequate funding.
Viewed in this light, court decrees are a valuable tool for obtaining funding
for the important, but often politically powerless, constituency served by the
child care community.
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Another benefit of the judicial process is that it heightens public awareness
and concem for the welfare of foster children. In G. L., the consent decree
sparked favorable news coverage and editorials for improvement in the system,
and, in addition, helped to influence the state legislature to establish a state
children's services conmiission that was directed, among other things, to
report annually to the legislature concerning compliance with the terms of the
decree [46].
De Tocqueville observed in 1835 that judge-made law in America is an
important source of social change [47]. It has taken over a century for that
observation to become true for children in foster care; now that it has occurred,
there is far more reason for child welfare professionals to welcome this
dynamic development than there is to fear it. •
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